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MAKING THE FAMILIAR
CONVENTIONAL AGAIN

Steven L. Winter*
MINDING THE LAW. By Anthony G. Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2000. Pp. 448. $35.

In 1984, Gerald L6pez published his groundbreaking and still re
markable Lay Lawyering,1 employing then-recent developments in
cognitive science to reexamine and reconfigure basic questions of law
and legal reasoning. Three years later, Charles Lawrence's The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism2 used
insights from cognitive and Freudian psychology to probe the problem
of racism and the inadequacy of the law's response. George Lakoff's
Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things appeared that same year.3 It was
followed by a series of articles in which I examined a range of legal
and theoretical issues in light of the new learning about categorization
and human reasoning.4 Nineteen ninety-three saw the publication of
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1974, Yeshiva University; J.D. 1 977,
Columbia University School of Law. Professor Winter is the author of A Clearing in the For
est: Law, Life, and Mind from the University of Chicago Press, available November 2001.
-Ed.
I am grateful to Emilio Boehringer for his research assistance and to Lynn Winter, Mark
Johnson, Gary Minda, Jeremy Paul, and Dick Posner for their sound advice and stalwart
support. This work was supported by a summer research grant from the Brooklyn Law
School.

1. 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984). Other early applications of cognitive science are John D.
Ayer, Isn't There Enough Reality to Go Around? An Essay on the Unspoken Promises of
Our Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 475 (1978), and John L. Barkai, A New Model for Legal Com
munication: Sensory Experience and Representational Systems, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 575
(1980).
2. 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
3. GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987). That same year also saw the publication of Mark
Johnson's important companion volume. MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE
BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987).
4. See, e.g.,
Governance, 40

Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self
STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988) (hereinafter Winter, Metaphor of Standing];
Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes
for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1 105 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, Transcendental Nonsense];
Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension ofthe Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989) (hereinafter Winter, Narrative Meaning]; Steven L.
Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 635 (1990); Steven L.
Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEXAS L. REV.
1881 (1991) [hereinafter Winter, Upside/Down View]; Steven L. Winter, Death ls the Mother
of Metaphor, 105 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1992) (review essay); Steven L. Winter, The Meaning
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articles by my colleagues Gary Minda and Donald Jones on, respec
tively, cognitive theory and the law of boycotts and the linguistic and
metaphorical construction of race. 5 Two years later, Gary L. Blasi's
What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory6 and Linda Hamilton Krieger's The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity1 both appeared. More recently, Larry
Solan has reexamined issues of statutory construction and criminal law
in light of what cognitive science has revealed about how humans ac
tually categorize and reason.8
For all that, cognitive studies of law remain marginal in the acad
emy. So, for those toiling in the field, the arrival of Anthony
Amsterdam9 and Jerome Bruner's10 Minding the Law is an occasion of
some moment. After all, when two such eminences grises turn their
considerable intellectual talents to a burgeoning if still nascent subject,
one has reason to expect the kind of epochal statement that can galva
nize or reformulate a field. Jerome Bruner is a titan of cognitive and
cultural psychology, the author of several books and numerous articles

of "Under Color of' Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1992) [hereinafter Winter, "Under Color
of' Law]; Steven L. Winter, The Constitution of Conscience, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1805 (1994).
Two other articles from the same period are Jay Feinman's The Jurisprudence of Classifica
tion, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1989) and Albert J. Moore's Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in
the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273 (1989).

5. Gary Minda, The Law and Metaphor of Boycott, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 807 (1993); D.
Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437
(1993). Minda has further developed these ideas in a fine book. GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN
AMERICA: How IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND (1999).
6. 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1995); see also Brook K. Baker, Beyond Macerate: The Role
of Context, Experience, Theory, and Reflection in Ecological Learning, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 287
(1994); Gary L. Blasi, What's a Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholar
ship, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063 (1996); John Martinez, A Cognitive Science Approach to
Teaching Property Rights in Body Parts, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 290 (1992).
7. 47 STAN. L. REV. 1 161 (1995); see also Linda Hamilton
troika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L.

Krieger, Civil Rights
REV. 1251 (1998).

Peres

8. Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1998);
Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 235; Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases:
Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 105 (1999); see also LAWRENCE
M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993). For other recent work applying cognitive
theory to law, see Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 767 (2000); Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative
Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305 (1999); Stuart P.
Green, Prototype Theory and the Classification of Offenses in a Revised Model Penal Code:
A General Approach to the Special Part, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 301 (2000); and Patrick J.
Ryan, A Mental Model of Civil Procedure 28 RUTGERS L.J. 637 (1997).
9. Judge Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
10. Research Professor of Psychology, Senior Research Fellow, New York University
School of Law.
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on education, mind, and culture.1 1 Tony Amsterdam is a legendary fig
ure both in the profession and in the academy. One of the country's
leading litigators, his work with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in
cludes such landmark cases as Furman v. Georgia12 and Lockett v.
Ohio.13 He is also a pioneer of clinical legal education and the author
of the classic article on the Fourth Amendment.1 4 Add to this an al
ready vibrant literature on which to build, and it should be easy to see
why expectations might run high. The combined expertise and experi
ence of two distinguished lifetimes should lead to the kind of magiste
rial work that plumbs the fundamental questions of the discipline or
marks out bold new directions for research and writing.
By this standard, the book is something of a disappointment. Not
that it doesn't have its moments. The chapter on categorization pro
vides a panoramic view of recent developments in the field that should
serve as an able introduction for those not versed in this material.
Chapter Three's discussion and redescription of Justice Scalia's plu
rality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.1 5 as instantiating classic
Western adultery myths is a standout. Chapter Nine's summation and
indictment of the way in which America's egalitarian promise has re
peatedly been smashed on the cruel anvil of race is an effective, often
moving jeremiad. And the book does a real service in drawing atten
tion to an important, too-often neglected area of study.
That alone is an invaluable contribution. Indeed, the authors char
acterize their book as a "propaedeutic," or introduction, to a more
productive theoretical study of law (p. 289). Still, for all its obvious
promise, the book never seems to transcend a garden-variety legal re
alism: "Our aim," the authors proclaim, "is to intensify awareness of
the decisions and choices constantly being made by the people who
make the law - and of the cognitive devices that those people are
1 1. See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING (1990) [hereinafter BRUNER, ACTS
OF MEANING]; JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS (1986); JEROME
BRUNER, THE CULTURE OF EDUCATION (1996); JEROME S. BRUNER, ON KNOWING:
ESSAYS FOR THE LEFT HAND (1979); JEROME S. BRUNER, THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION
(1960); JEROME S. BRUNER, TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTRUCTION (1966); JEROME S.
BRUNER, J.J. GOODNOW, & G. A. AUSTIN, A STUDY OF THINKING (1956).
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
13. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Amsterdam also appeared before the Supreme Court in Pulley
v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (arguing No. 70-57, United States v. Caldwell); Maxwell v.
Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970); and Georgia v.
Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966) (civil rights removal). During this same period, he participated
in other civil rights and death penalty cases far too numerous to mention.
14. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349 (1974). Until the recent change in the Bluebook, his student note was the only student
authored article conventionally cited by author. ·Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void
for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
15. 491 U.S. 1 10 (1989).
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forever using to conceal their choices and avoid responsibility for their
decisions" (p. 247). In the end, the book provides only the most etio
lated accounts of mind as unsituated subjectivity and of law as nothing
but the product of rhetorical manipulation. I take up the question of
why in Part I of this Review. The answer, I think, is instructive: it says
something not only about the current state of legal theory, but also
more broadly about scholarship as an inherently communal enterprise.
The succeeding sections defend these claims in more particular con
texts: Part II focuses on the discussions of categorization, rhetoric, and
Justice Powell's majority opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp16; Part III fo
cuses on the book's claims with respect to narrative and Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H.; and Part IV offers, by way of
conclusion, an alternative prolegomenon to the study of law and mind
that focuses on what I believe to be the larger political and social
theoretical stakes.
I.

SANTAYANA'S FIRST COROLLARY

At this stage of the game, a book on cognitive theory and law
should take up the big questions. One reason the book disappoints is
that it fails to face up to the issues raised by the material with which it
deals. It notes that "[h]ow the category game is played is among the
founding quandaries of philosophy of mind" (p. 26), but it explicitly
declines to commit itself to a particular view of categorization (pp. 2627, 29, 37-42). Though it recognizes that the questions of how category
prototypes are formed and how similarity within a category is judged
are "of interest in trying to understand how legal categories come into
being and are used" (p. 41), it never returns to those issues. So, too,
the book never grapples with the question of the nature of law - i.e.,
what law is and how it is supposed to operate. It raises but, in the end,
finesses the question of "how cultural predilections find their way into
the adjudicative process" (p. 77). Perhaps most glaringly, it concludes
with the observation that law "is ciriven neither by immutable truths
engraved in a fixed body of rules, nor by arbitrary whims or vanities"
(p. 291), but in fact says very little about what might lie between those
widely separated (and hopelessly conventional) poles - providing in
stead an account that stresses judicial acts of categorization and rhe
torical legerdemain.
How could this happen? The explanation, I think, lies in funda
mental missteps with respect to organization and standpoint. These
two problems are mutually reinforcing; together they determine the
warp and woof of the book's peculiar shortcomings.

16. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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The organizational problem can be variously characterized, but the
heart of it is a striking disjuncture between the insights introduced in
the initial chapter on categorization and the subsequent, hands-on
analyses of the topics it takes up. The book appears to have been writ
ten in alternating chapters on mind and law; each oar laboring quite
separately. Perhaps if the "law" chapters had been integrated with the
"mind" chapters - so that the discussions of the categorization and
rhetorics of particular judicial opinions appeared as illustrations or
demonstrations of specific theoretical claims - this would have kept
the discussion on its theoretical tracks. But the discrepancies go
deeper than the discordance between the discussions of mind and law:
because the book never commits itself to a particular theory of mind
- too often aspiring to be all things to all people17 - it cannot main
tain the theoretical consistency a project of this sort demands. Even
within the chapters on categorization and narrative, the book often
fails to reckon with the epistemological implications of its earlier dis
cussion; indeed, it frequently reverts to exactly those conventional un
derstandings of mind and law that the material on categorization has
undermined. In short, the authors fail to heed their own warning that
"epistemological issues, with or without ideological dimension, almost
always have a consequence for how one goes about one's business."18
The problem of standpoint is twofold. The first is immediately ap
parent from the introduction's disclaimer (pp. 7-8): the principal legal
texts chosen for close reading are decisions of the Supreme Court,
mostly on matters of race, with which the authors disagree. (Several,
in fact, are cases on which Amsterdam worked or which were litigated
by former students.) The authors disclaim any intent to criticize these
decisions, though they admit that these particular cases were chosen
because their "results struck us as unjust" (p. 7). The actual discus
sions leave little doubt about the depth of the authors' feelings; as they
concede: "our biases will show, sometimes clearly enough" (p. 10).
But this is not a book about the Supreme Court's mishandling of
race, or any other legal issue. As the authors note: "To criticize
those . . . results would· require normative analyses (including, con
spicuously, a statement of our own 'values and the reasons for them)
that constitute a wholly different subject than the subject of this book"
(p. 7). This is a book on how the workings of mind affect the doings of
law. The decision to study and critique the rhetorical moves of only
conservative decisions is, therefore, an odd choice. For one thing, one
does not profitably study a phenomenon by observing only those por
tions of it with which one disagrees and about which one has strong
17. Where else would one find Noam Chomsky, George Lakoff, and Clifford Geertz
neatly synopsized and synthesized all within the space of a few pages? Pp. 38-41.
18. P. 218; cf ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 1-3
(1975).
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feelings. For another, this tactic makes it hard for the reader to assess
the relevance of cognitive studies to law. The a'uthors acknowledge (p.
8) that the same strategies of narrative and rhetoric are . used by
Justices of all ideological stripes. Yet, if everyone uses them - indeed,
if everyone necessarily uses them because that is how human minds
work19
then it is not at all clear how an exposition of those strate
gies furthers our understanding of law. No one, for example, thinks
that the fact that all sides frame their arguments in impeccable English
means that a well-done work on English grammar will reveal anything
important about law. If the narrative and rhetorical strategies have
some valence (whether political or conceptual), if they carry some
practical implication for how we might do law differently, then the
study of mind and law is of the greatest importance. 20 But this book
leaves us only with the trite admonition that we should be more reflec
tive about our tropes (pp. 8, 297).
Which brings us immediately to the second problem of standpoint.
Noting that "lawyers are not the only ones steeped in these proc
esses," the authors declare their "good fortune" that "much insightful
study has recently delved these ubiquitous human doings in their gen
eral aspects, outside the law " (p. 3; emphasis added). The authors,
thus, present themselves as outside experts offering new knowledge to
illuminate the law. But, in striking that pose, the authors ignore more
than fifteen years of painstaking work within the legal academy apply
ing these insights to law. The dangers of this omission can be serious:
as Bruner has elsewhere noted, "the acquisition of knowledge is in
deed domain specific and not automatically transferable. . . . Each par
ticular way of using intelligence develops an integrity of its own . . .
that fits it to a particular range of applicability."21 In the case of legal
theory, this omission is particularly deadly because of its ongoing, cen
tury-long struggle to escape the remarkably tenacious grasp of the
twin ogres of formalism and positivism. 22Yet, the singular importance
-

19. Thus, the authors characterize their book as "about commonplace hidden pitfalls
and snares that infest every path that any lawyer or judge could follow," p. 287, and conclude
with the observation that, "if we are even close to the mark about how law is interpreted and
conducted in real life, it is impossible for lawyers not to be engaged in literary, psychological,
cultural, and rhetorical issues. They will be in the thick of them - inevitably." P. 291.
20. See, e.g., Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 4, at 1113; Steven L. Winter,
One Size Fits All, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1857, 1867-68 (1994). For concrete examples, see
Winter, An Upside/Down View, supra note 4; Winter, "Under Color of' Law, supra note 4;
and Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 4.
21. Jerome Bruner,
(1991).

The Narrative Construction of Reality,

18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 2

22. Cf ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 1 -14
(1983).
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of recent developments in cognitive theory is that they provide the
tools with which to transcend precisely those pitfalls. 23
In the event, this omission has several negative consequences
ranging from the seemingly inconsequential (though really quite sub
stantive) to the obviously profound. Consider at this point three ex
amples. First, Amsterdam and Bruner twice trot out the old saw about
the Inuit (the so-called Eskimos) having twenty words for snow (pp.
27, 142) even though this particular trope was thoroughly discredited
more than a decade ago. 24 English has just as many words for snow e.g., slush, sleet, dusting, flurry, blizzard, avalanche, hardpack, and
powder. This may at first blush seem trivial; in fact, it is central to the
question of how categories come into being. The reason both we and
the Inuit have many words for snow is that linguistic meaning is a
pragmatic function that enables us to cope with our environment more
effectively - and this is true whether one drives a snowmobile, a dog
sled, or a sports utility vehicle. Second, the authors note Berlin and
Kay's findings about the regularities in color terms throughout the
world's languages and observe that, "Nobody quite understands why
this order prevails (p. 21)." Yet, there is a quite detailed neurological
account of this phenomenon, as I have previously discussed.2 5 And
this, too, matters a great deal because it exemplifies the crucial role of
embodiment in cognition, a point we will return to in Part III.
Third, a good part of the book concerns issues of race. Several
chapters are devoted to close readings of the Court's opinions in cases
such as Prigg v. Pennsylvania,26 Plessy v. Ferguson,27 McCleskey v.
Kemp, and Freeman v. Pitts.28 Amsterdam and Bruner dissect the ways
in which the authors of those opinions use rhetoric and narrative to
obscure the baleful effects of official policy on African Americans.
"These rhetorical strategies," they explain, "have the effect of allow
ing the Court to conceal from itself the reality of the choice that it is
making" (p. 210). Summarizing their claims, the authors observe that,
"We have faulted Justices for ignoring or masking choices that they
23. See, e.g. , Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra
Is the Mother of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 746-49, 757-64.

note 4, at 1107-14; Winter,

Death

24. See GEOFFREY K. PULLUM, THE GREAT ESKIMO VOCABULARY HOAX 166 (1991)
("The prevalence of the great Eskimo snow hoax is testimony to falling standards in acade
mia, but also to a wider tendency . . . toward fundamentally anti-intellectual 'gee-whiz'
modes of discourse and increasing ignorance of scientific thought."), discussed in Steven L.
Winter, Confident, But Still Not Positive, 25 CONN. L. REV. 893, 912-13 (1993).
25. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 4, at 1136-41 (discussing BRENT
BERLIN & PAUL KAY, BASIC COLOR TERMS: THEIR UNIVERSALITY AND EVOLUTION 7-12
(1969), and Paul Kay & Chad K. McDaniel, The Linguistic Significance of the Meanings of
Basic Color Terms, 54 LANGUAGE 610, 617-26 (1978)).
26. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
27. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
28. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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put out of play simply by the way they carved their categories, told
their stories, or arrayed their words, without acknowledgment of these
processes."29 This quite traditional line of argument presupposes that
these are deliberate choices, rather than the effects of cultural atti
tudes and biases deeply inscribed in our categories, our metaphors,
and our psyches. That latter point is, of course, the central lesson of
Lawrence's, Jones's, and Krieger's important work. But, even on the
former, more conventional assumption of choice, it is surprising that
the question of what underlies or motivates those choices is never
broached.30 There is simply no mention of the antecedent work on the
cognitive and linguistic aspects of race, let alone any examination of
how the phenomena documented by other scholars of mind play out in
(or are absent from) these particular decisions.31
Omissions of this sort mar the book in fundamental ways. It is not
just a matter of the proprieties of scholarship: these omissions detract
in material ways from the book's substance. Litigators and students of
the federal courts understand the value of the Supreme Court's policy
sometimes to delay consideration of a case so that difficult or impor
tant issues can be vetted in the lower courts. 3 2 Much the same is true
with respect to scholarship, where prior discussions help clarify and
refine issues, identify flawed arguments and unpromising lines of in
quiry, or reformulate old questions in new and more productive ways.
A scholar who takes up an area of inquiry without reckoning with the
existing literature runs the very serious risk of missing the real issues
or, at the least, reinventing the wheel. Thus, we might say that the first
29. P. 287. For a nuanced and sophisticated argument of this sort that probes the ways in
which such "choices" are constructed, see MINDA, supra note 5, at 35, 86-98.
30. Consider the following passage from the introduction:
[W]e do not intend to portray the Justices as either villains or heroes. Just as our purpose
does not extend to criticizing the Justices' results, it does not extend to analyzing their mo
tives. We have neither the information nor the competence to offer assessments in any of the
dimensions that distinguish Goodies from Baddies - or to pretend to know what those di
mensions might be. [p. 8]
Note the way in which this passage presupposes subjective or individual motive (and the
concomitant attribution of fault), but disclaims any and all ability to discern it. Some might
think it remarkable that a book on mind and cognition carries no implications for the ques
tion of human motivations.
31. Though Cover's work is noted, p: 364 n.3, there is no discussion of his use of the the
ory of cognitive dissonance to explain the opinions in antebellum decisions such as Prigg.
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 16674, 240-43 (1975).
32. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
opinion respecting the denial of certiorari) ("A case may raise an important question but . . .
[i]t may be desirable to have different aspects of an issue further illumined by the lower
courts. Wise adjudication has its own time for ripening."); RICHARD POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 163 (1985); see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
84 F.3d 734, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that individual lawsuits are superior to class ac
tions for "incipient" or "immature" mass torts because they allow for the exploration and
development of difficult issues such as causation).
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corollary of George Santayana's famous dictum is that those who
don't contend with the literature are doomed to repeat it. 33
Unfortunately, this book provides ample evidence of the failure to
engage. It is manifest in the way in which the book repeatedly misses
the implications of its own discussion of the recent work on categoriza
tion and atavistically reproduces the most conventional assumptions
about rationality and law. I will examine these phenomena in greater
depth and detail in the sections to follow. Consider, for now, two of
Amsterdam and Bruner's closing observations. "Results in the law,"
they tell us,
are achieved by the application of specialized legal reasoning - reason
ing within and about doctrinal rules, procedural requirements, constitu
tional and other jurisprudential theories - and are typically articulated
almost wholly in those terms. But final results are underdetermined by
such rules, requirements, and theories. [p. 287]

They characterize their contribution thus: "We hope our labors show
that decisions which the Justices treated as logically compelled or as
grounded in inexorable givens of law and fact were neither" (p. 287).
But, surely, we did not need recent developments from the science of
the mind just to make points that the legal realists and their successors
in the critical legal studies movement have been pressing for a cen
tury.3 4 When Amsterdam and Bruner say they aim to intensify aware
ness and expose the cognitive devices by which legal decisionmakers
conceal their choices and avoid responsibility (p. 247), it is hard not to
hear Felix Cohen's famous admonition of sixty-five years ago:
When the vivid fictions and metaphors of traditional jurisprudence are
thought of as reasons for decisions, rather than poetical or mnemonic de
vices for formulating decisions reached on other grounds, then the
author, as well as the reader, of the opinion or argument, is apt to forget
the social forces which mold the law.35

True, the point probably bears repeating. Nevertheless, I remain con
fident that the striking advances in cognitive science represent some
thing more than another occasion for the reminder that we should all
be more self-aware.36 Amsterdam and Bruner set out "to make the
33. See GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.")

284 (1905)

("Those who cannot

34. Even Daniel Williams's otherwise favorable review acknowledges that for "schol
ars . . . this book might have a 'ho hum' quality to it. It is true that much of what one finds in
Minding the Law has been circulating within legal academia for nearly two decades." Daniel
A. Williams, The Lawyer's Bookshelf" Minding the Law, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 2000, at 2.
Williams, however, ignores the foundational contributions of the realists, thus understating
the point.
35. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 812 (1935).
36. How much more - and the relationship between these developments and the most
sophisticated of the legal realist insights - is the subject of my forthcoming book, STEVEN L.
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familiar strange again" (pp. 1, 134, 286). In the final analysis, however,
they succeed merely in making it conventional all over again.
There is a unifying theme to the problems I have canvassed under
the rubrics of organization and standpoint. The authors observe that
"[i]magination flourishes in aggregation and exchange" (p. 236), but
their book is surprisingly monological. It is monological in the way
that different portions of the book do not speak to each other. It is
monological in its refusal to engage in dialogue on the underlying val
ues that plainly motivate its critique of the Supreme Court's decisions
on race. And it is monological in not taking more seriously the impor
tance of dialogue with other scholars in defining and extending the ho
rizons of intellectual inquiry.
II.

MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES- MCCLESKEY

Jerome Bruner is perhaps best known for his social constructivism
and his insistence that "culture is constitutive of mind."37 But the
manner in which the authors connect culture to mind in the current
book fails to illuminate the very phenomena they seek to explain.
Sometimes, as in the discussion of McCleskey, this failure is quite
dramatic.
The opening chapter on categorization starts out promising enough
(Chapter Two). Categories, the authors observe, are necessary labor
saving devices that allow us to aggregate experience and treat things in
an already familiar way (p. 21). Categories are both adaptive and
"pragmatic" - i.e., they are refined or retooled as needed for the
tasks at hand. (Remember all the different English words for the cate
gory "snow?") "In short, our categories are grounded in conceptions
of what matters to ourselves and those on whom we depend - our ref
erence groups . . . the people with whom we feel interdependent in the
conduct of life" (p. 23). Categories, thus, "promote cohesiveness
within cultural groups" and concomitantly exclude or serve to domi
nate others (p. 34). Consequently, categories can be and sometimes
are made the subject of contests for control. But categories generally
become entrenched and shape our very perceptions of the world (pp.
36-37).
The authors note the "newer, more experiential" understanding of
categorization "that has challenged the old rationalism" (p. 40). For
mal category structures operate in a way that seems virtually inde
pendent of context; but, such formal categories "fail (and do not even
WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (available Nov. 2001). I pro
vide some illustrations in the sections that follow.
37. BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING, supra note 11, at 33; Bruner, supra note 21, at 20
("(T]he human mind cannot express its nascent powers without the enablement of the sym
bolic systems of culture.").
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try) to map more than a minute and superficial sector of the human
scene" (pp. 43-44). The authors underscore the point with the observa
tion that both life and law "are worlds where, as Richard Rorty puts it
laconically, 'no interesting descriptive term has any interesting neces
sary or sufficient conditions.' "38 Most of our categories involve "praxic
knowledge . . . about how the world operates" in the form of scripts (p.
45). This is what L6pez discussed under the rubric of "stock stories"
and, following Lakoff, I have discussed under the rubric of "idealized
cognitive models."39 Categories formed in this way, as has been ex
plained, 40 produce a variety of prototype effects. The authors note the
earlier (though quickly rejected) assumption that categories formed
around prototype experiences, but quite wisely "tend toward the
view" that "prototypes . . . function tropologically to capture the na
ture of the system from which a set of categories emerges or is de
rived" (p. 41).
So far, so good. Some will recognize the congruence between this
description and the account of categorization that has been the cen
terpiece of my work for more than a decade. It should be evident, too,
that this understanding of categorization provides an account of cul
ture as the ensemble of knowledge or "know-how" by which people
simultaneously negotiate and construct their world. As the authors ob
serve: "If culture is anything, it is a network of models of the world,
ways of getting on in it, of tools for thinking and imagining that range
from systems of mathematics to genres of storytelling. "41
But problems quickly arise. Despite having noted the challenge
posed by the new learning on categorization, the authors instinctively
revert to all the assumptions of "the old rationalism."
What are those assumptions? They will seem familiar (if not, in
deed, self-evident) because they comprise the Western tradition's core
conception of rationality. On those assumptions, reason is understood
as hierarchical (i.e., top-down or involving the subsumption of par
ticulars under general rules), definitional (i.e., things are understood
38. P. 43. Similarly, with respect to speech act theory, the authors note:
[T]he felicity conditions for various illocutionary acts have turned out to be strongly resistant
to any kind of comprehensive or unambiguous codification, except for a few highly ritualized
speech acts like christening a ship .... And even for those ritualized acts, the specification of

the necessary and sufficient conditions will hold good only within a narrow range of rela
tively commonplace circumstances.

P. 170.
39.

See material

40.

See, e.g. ,

cited supra notes 1, 3, & 4.

Winter,

Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 4,

at 1136-42, 115 1-5 6.

41. P. 39. Cf. Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn, Culture and Cognition, in CULTURAL
MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 4 (D. Holland & N. Quinn eds., 1987) (viewing cul
ture as "shared knowledge - not a people's customs and artifacts and oral traditions, but
what they must know in order to act as they do, make the things they make, and interpret
their experience in the distinctive way they do").
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reductively in terms of the elements that comprise their necessary and
sufficient conditions), and characterized by closure (i.e., as in the law
of the excluded middle). This view is reflected in the standard form of
legal reasoning, which consists in abstracting from an authoritative le
gal text the principles or criteria that express its necessary and suffi
cient conditions and, then, deciding the particular case by determining
whether it corresponds to those criteria. The "old rationalism" tends
heavily toward a binary logic, as in the conventional tautology of for
mal logic: P or not-P. This is reflected as well in a set of traditional du
alisms that divide the world into subject and object, mind and body,
internal and external, freedom and constraint.
This traditional view is the one actually applied by Amsterdam and
Bruner throughout their book. Categories, it turns out, are not built
on praxic knowledge; they are top-down. "They are derived," the
authors repeatedly assert, "consciously or unconsciously, from some
larger-scale theory or narrative about the canonical or desirable state
of things in the world. "42 Indeed, they "often get born as empty catego
ries" (p. 39). Categories aren't flexible; they are closed: "We take or
make our categories out of ordinary 'logic,' by dint of commonplace
rationality that tells us, say, that something can't be A and not-A" (p.
37). Legal reasoning, too, is necessarily hierarchical: "law could not
operate without a means of going from its generalities to the particu
larities of individual cases" (p. 140).
Not only that, but at a surprising number of junctures in the text,
categorization turns out to be criterial after all. In the chapter on cate
gorization, the authors maintain that "[c]ategory placement presup
poses some process for arriving at a judgment that the pertinent char
acteristics of the instance you are seeking to place fit the criteria you
take to be indicative of category membership."43 Consider, as well, two
legal examples.
In the discussion of Missouri v. Jenkins,44 we are told that Supreme
Court Rule 14.1 "intrinsically calls for a definition-matching ap
proach" (p. 67; emphasis added). Exactly why this is so is unclear. The
42. P. 22. This claim is repeated so often that it almost becomes a mantra: "[O]ur cate
gories are derived from more encompassing notions about how the world really is," p. 27;
"Our category systems derive from canonical general theories of the world and template
narratives about life," p. 28; "We remarked earlier that categories are usually derived or ab
stracted from either theories or stories," p. 29; "[c]ategories are derived or extracted from
larger-scale theories, stories, or normative redes about 'reality,' " p. 37.
43. Pp. 42-43 (emphasis changed from original). But see LAKOFF, supra note 3.
44. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). The question presented in Jenkins was whether, in ordering sal
ary increases, the district court ran afoul of the principle that "a school desegregation rem
edy . . . must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation and be tailored to cure
the condition that offends the Constitution . . ." Id. at 85 n.3. The argument was that the or
der was part of an effort to entice white suburban students across district lines by improving
the quality of inner-city schools and that, because the lower court had found no interdistrict
violation, the salary increase was beyond the court's remedial authority.
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Rule provides that "[o]nly the questions set out in the petition, or
fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court."4 5 The authors
maintain that, "In deciding whether an argument is out of bounds un
der this rule, the Supreme Court treats . . . the Questions Presented as
defining a category of potential contentions and asks whether or not
each argument advanced by the petitioner falls within the category"
(p. 67). But there seems to be no reason why the "fairly included" lan
guage should be read so narrowly; moreover, in previous cases the
Court had treated an antecedent or logically prior issue as within the
scope of the question presented.46
In the discussion of Michael H., the authors offer only two equally
criteria!, reductive readings of the cases on the constitutionally pro
tected right to privacy within the family. The authors argue that either
we identify the "special quality" that attends relationships within the
family and see whether the circumstances of the instant case meet
those, or we conclude that what "is special about those relationships
must derive exclusively from the pervasiveness, duration, and intensity
of the respect they have commanded" (pp. 106-07; emphasis changed
from original). The authors fault Justice Scalia for taking the second
route and ignoring the first. Yet, they never consider any other mode
of extending legal categories - such as, say, Llewellyn's "situation
sense"47 or one that looks to the needs and mores of contemporary
American families.
So, too, Amsterdam and Bruner repeatedly carve the world into
what looks suspiciously like the traditional dualism of objectivity and
subjectivity. They distinguish between judges who are "relatively
category-centered or relatively situation-centered" (p. 108). (But
weren't all those praxic understandings situation-centered? Were they
not categories?) They distinguish between "the canonical ways laid
down by a society's institutional forms" and "the possible worlds gen
erated by the rich imaginations of its members" (p. 15). And they dis
tinguish between rule-application "by deductive, analytic reasoning or
by the rules of induction" and what they call "the 'wild card' of all in
terpretation" (p. 287).
This last point is central to the argument of the book which, as in
timated earlier, trades on the conventional idea of subjectivity as es-

45. Sup. Ct. R. 14.l(a).
46. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 559 n.6 (1978). In Procunier, the Court granted
certiorari on the question whether a claim for negligence states a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983; it treated that question as subsuming the question whether the defendants
could not be sued because they were entitled to a qualified immunity. There, the Court also
noted that its power to decide is not limited by the precise terms of the question. Id. (citing
Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320 n.6 (1971)).
47. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 60-61,
122-23 (1961).
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sentially autonomous, unconstrained, and originary.48 This, after all, is
the underlying assumption of the timeworn critique that faults judges
for concealing unspoken purposes, values, or beliefs behind the logical
or rhetorical facade of their opinions. Thus, it is not surprising that
when Amsterdam and Bruner fault various judges for "masking
choices that they put out of play simply by the way they carved their
categories" (p. 287), what they show us is not how pre-existing social
categories import cultural predilections into the law, but rather how
judges achieve particular results by manipulating time frames (pp. 7273, 152-53), reifying concepts (pp. 103-05), or manipulating the level of
generality at which they state the relevant facts or legal concepts (pp.
67-71, 105-07). These are, of course, familiar modes of critique long
since made conventional by scholars associated with critical legal
�ud�s�
The assumption of an unconstrained subjectivity appears in more
explicit form throughout the book. Notwithstanding the entrenchment
of categories "in institutions, in habits of life, in the very language we
speak" (p. 36), we are told that, "[c]ategory systems are, in the main,
under human control."50 The authors seek tO explain various judicial
opinions in terms of canonical narratives of Western adultery myths or
of heroes-turned-tyrants, but this explanation breaks down once we
are told that the authors of these judicial tales are free to frame the
story any way they like. 51 So, too, autonomous or originary subjectivity
determines the shape of reality. Consider these examples:
·

- "[J]udicial opinions, like other texts, contain the world of which they
speak and, by impressing their structure on it, create it in. their image."
[p. 144]
48. There is, of course, an extensive literature on this phenomenon and its persistence in
legal scholarship. See, e.g. , Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627,
1630-31 (1991) ("[I]n their very rhetoric, all these modes of contemporary legal thought es
tablish, depend upon, and eclipse a quintessentially liberal individual subject - what I have
elsewhere called the relatively autonomous self . . . . ); Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est
Moi" - The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1631 (1990); see also Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Con
stitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1 441, 1476-94 (1990).
"

49. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN. L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1981); Jay Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method,
97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 704-05 (1984); Jennifer Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Meth
odology for Teaching, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249 (1986); Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal Rea
soning, 3 RESEARCH L. & Soc. 27 (1982); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law,
73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1157-58 (1985); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 135 (1988); see also LAURENCE TRIBE &
MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 98 (1991).
50. P. 35. To be clear, there is a huge difference between the insight that categories are
humanly constructed (in social institutions, forms of life, and language) and the claim that
any particular human or group of humans has control over the shape or content of those
categories.
5 1 . "What is Trouble and what is Resolution are determined largely by where the teller
of the tale chooses to begin it." P. 153.

May 2001]

Conventional Again

1621

- "Western history is a running commentary on the efforts of the pow
erful to impose a conception of reality of those they would rule."52
- "Any interpretive construction backed by the power of authority be
comes a real social institution." [p. 226]
- "[A]n individual's possible worlds can readily become collective vi
sions (utopian, apocalyptic, redemptive, demonic), later to be institution
alized into possible world communities, local, religious, criminal." [p.

236]
The conventional view of unfettered and unsituated subjectivity
achieves an apotheosis of sorts in the discussion of Justice Powell's
McCleskey opinion. 53 Noting Justice Powell's change of heart about his
vote in McCleskey, the authors offer a close reading of the opinion as
"an instructive study of the means by which rhetorics achieve a self
justification that is strong enough to kill but not strong enough to en
dure much beyond the killing" (p. 194) and as "a striking symbol of
rhetorics' magic" (p. 216). The lesson they would have us draw is that
"we end up buying our own rhetorics as avidly as we sell them to oth
ers," and t�ey suggest that "[p]erhaps this is why . . . judges deciding
cases often write exactly like advocates arguing them - even when, as
is inherently true in the case of United States Supreme Court Justices,
they sit on a court of last resort and need fear no subcelestial reversal"
(p. 176). Here, apparently, is a view of"subjectivity as so variable, un
certain, inconstant, unstable, and mercurial that it can neither with
stand nor stand by the blandishments of its own beguiling rhetoric.
But one doesn't have to look far for a more cogent account, either
of the decision or of Powell's subsequent change of heart. Powell tells
us in his opinion precisely why he decided as he did; his rather candid
self-presentation, moreover, provides a key for unlocking his subse
quent change of heart.
The authors devote a fair amount of space to McCleskey (pp. 18889, 194-216), but for our purposes the story can easily be telescoped.
On the basis of an unusually thorough statistical study by Professor

52. P. 225. A full- fledged discussion of the fatal theoretical flaws in this conventional
assertion can be found in Steven L. Winter, The "Power" Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 721 (1996).
I provide a precis below in Part IV. Contrast Bruner's observation in an earlier work that,
"For all our power to construct symbolic cultures and to set in place the institutional forces
needed for their execution, we do not seem very adept at steering our creations toward the
ends we profess .. . . " BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING, supra note 11, at 23.
5 3. Thus, the authors note that Justice Powell "manages with . . . complete consistency
to disregard whatever might obstruct his chosen line of march," pp. 202- 03; that he and other
Justices profess the importance of racial equality "whenever they elect to promote that
value," p. 203; and, more implausibly, that he "imbues the words 'indicate' and 'risk' with
connotations of conjecture" and "wdes the word 'prove' with connotations of actuality," p.
206 (emphasis added). Of course, that is exactly what those words normally connote - as a
quick check of your dictionary will confirm.
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David Baldus and his colleagues,s4 Warren McCleskey challenged the
administration of Georgia's capital punishment system. Basically, the
Baldus s_tudy showed that - controlling for as many as 230 variables
- there was a pattern of discrimination based on the race of the vic
tim. White-victim cases, the study showed, were seven times more
likely to result in death sentences than black-victim cases; and black
defendants who killed white victims were two-and-a-half times more
likely to receive the death sentence than were their white counter
parts.ss The racial disparities were greater still in the "mid-range"
cases - that is, cases that were neither among the most aggravated
(and, so, likely to receive a death sentence in any case) nor the least
aggravated (and, therefore, unlikely to receive a death sentence).s6 In
deed, the race of the victim was twice as strong a predictor of a death
sentence as was the fact that the victim was a police officer (as, in fact,
McCleskey's victim was).s7 Though the district court rejected the study
as flawed, both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court assumed
the study was statistically valid.58 The Court ruled, however, that the
study did not prove the kind of discrimination prohibited by the Four
teenth Amendment nor the cruel and unusual administration of pun
ishment prohibited by the Eighth.
The authors detail the uses of rhetoric and categorization by which
Powell downplays the relevance of these statistics. Many of these cri
tiques are on target. We need consider only two, however, because
they simultaneously go to the heart of Powell's opinion and the
authors' principal theoretical claim.
Amsterdam and Bruner fault Powell because he stresses "the im
portance of the criminal justice function that would be jeopardized if
McCleskey's claim were recognized," but omits (or "discounts" they use both verbs) "the importance of the values of racial equality
that would be jeopardized if McCleskey's claims are not recognized."s9
This omission, they conclude, "conspicuously leaves the opinion lack
ing half the makings of the cost/benefit analysis that Justice Powell is
ostensibly conducting" (p. 203).

54. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).
55. Id. at 315 tbl.50. There were very few death sentences in black victim cases, though
white defendants were slightly more likely to draw them.
56.

Id. at

57.

Id.

401-02.

at 319-20 tbl.52; id. at 588-89 app.J.

58. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.7 (1989). They did so, moreover, without
reviewing or reversing the trial court's contrary findings of fact. In part, this was because
everyone understood that the study was state of the art; in part, it was because the courts
wished to foreclose all such challenges to the death penalty.
59. P. 203; see also pp. 188-89.
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The key word here is "ostensible." Perhaps Powell is conducting a
sub silentio cost/benefit analysis, but he rather sounds like he is treat
ing the criminal justice system as a value that simply trumps all others:
McCleskey's statistical proffer must be viewed in the context of his chal
lenge. McCleskey challenges decisions at the heart of the State's criminal
justice system. "One of society's most basic tasks is that of protecting the
lives of its citizens and one of the most basic ways in which it achieves the
task is through criminal laws against murder." . . . Implementation of
these laws necessarily requires discretionary judgments. Because discre
tion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand excep
tionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been
abused.60

The authors note that "the invocation of the lion-hearted 'criminal jus
tice system' recurs like a mantra throughout the McCleskey opinion"
(p. 188). One might take this repetition as a sign of anxiety61 - i.e.,
that Powell feared McCleskey's claims somehow put the system itself
at risk:
McCleskey's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.
The Eighth Amendment is not limited in application to capital punish
ment, but applies to all penalties . . . . Thus, if we accepted McCleskey's
claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing de
cision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of
penalty. Moreover, the claim that his sentence rests on the irrelevant fac
tor of race easily could be extended to apply to claims based on unex
plained discrepancies that correlate to membership in other minority
groups, and even to gender. Similarly, since McCleskey's claim relates to
the race of his victim, other claims could apply with equally logical force
to statistical disparities that correlate with the race or sex of other actors
in the criminal justice system, such as defense attorneys or judges. Also,
there is no logical reason that such a claim need be limited to racial or
sexual bias. If arbitrary and capricious punishment is the touchstone un
der the Eighth Amendment, such a claim could - at least in theory - be
based upon any arbitrary variable, such as the defendant's facial charac
teristics, or the physical attractiveness of the defendant or the vic
tim. . . . 62

Amsterdam and Bruner criticize the "slippery slope" logic of this
passage, arguing (in part) that there are preexisting legal principles
with which the Court might have cut off this freefall to absurdity (p.
214-15). This is oftentrue of slippery slope arguments, as critics of the

60.

Id.

at 297.

61. Cf. COVER, supra note 31, at 226-56 (using the theory of cognitive dissonance to ex
plain the belabored formalism in the fugitive slave opinions of Story, Shaw, and other aboli
tionist judges).
62.

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at

314-19 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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genre like to point out.63 The problem, however, is that the logic of the
first step usually proves corrosive to the ostensible principles that
would cabin it.
This is particularly true here, where the logic of the first step is the
basic concept of fair and equal treatment. While McCleskey was
pending in the lower courts, the Justice Department released a report
it had commissioned from the Rand Corporation studying patterns of
incarceration in three states over a two-year period. The study showed
that whites received shorter prison terms and were paroled sooner
than African or Hispanic Americans convicted of the same crimes.64
Judge Vance raised the Rand study in a question from the bench dur
ing oral argument before the Eleventh Circuit en bane; neither he nor
the majority of that court were persuaded by the response that "death
is different."65 Powell's McCleskey opinion does not cite the Rand
study, but it does cite other empirical studies pointing to discrimina
tion in the criminal justice system on the basis of race, gender, and
even appearance.66
To Justice Brennan, the Court's concern not to "open the door to
widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing" represents
"a fear of too much justice."67 And, in my view, Brennan has the better
of the argument. But Brennan simultaneously concedes the force of
the slippery slope · argument: "[S]urely," he continues, "the majority
would acknowledge that if striking evidence indicated that other mi
nority groups, or women, or even persons with blond hair, were dis
proportionately sentenced to death, such a state of affairs would be
repugnant to deeply rooted conceptions of fairness."68
We don't have to look far to understand why most judges would be
reluctant to put the existing system in jeopardy. Here, the authors em
phasize the judges' exercise of choice. Elsewhere, Bruner has ex
plained that we do not "shoot our values from the hip, choice-situation

63. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 369 (1985)
("Because the slippery slope argument responds to an asserted difference between the in
stant case and the danger case, the argument presupposes a linguistic description of the in
stant case that distinguishes it from the danger case."); id. at 382 (arguing that "a slippery
slope effect is always in logical and linguistic theory eliminable").
64.

White Inmates Freed Earlier, WASH. POST, July 1,
.

65. Fay S. Joyce, Hearing ls Urged on
at A21.

1993, at A13.

.

Georgia Death Penalty,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1984,

66. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315 - 18 nn.38, 40, 43 & 44. If discrimination on the basis of
appearance still seems a farfetched claim, consider the proposed Santa Cruz ordinance and
other material discussed in Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-8 (2000). See also Note, Facial Discrimination:
Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appear
ance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035 (1987).

67.

McCleskey,

68.

Id.

481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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by choice-situation. . . . Rather, they are communal and consequential
in terms of our relations to the cultural community. They fulfill func
tions for us in that community . . . . They become incorporated in one's
self identity and, at the same time, they locate ·one in a culture."69 The
character of the judge is one such culturally-defined identity.
At a later point, the authors read Robert Cover's observation that
judicial decisions play out in "a field of pain and death"70 to say that
everything is not, in the end, interpretive (p. 226). But Cover's actual
point is that legal interpretation must be understood as part of a social
practice of violence.71 Cover puts it bluntly, "Judges are people of
violence."72 Because the judge's authority to do violence is always un
der challenge (if only by McCleskey and his lawyers), the judge must
"separate the exercise of violence from his own person. The only way
in which the employment of force is not revealed as a naked ju
rispathic act is through the judge's elaboration of the institutional
privilege of force. . . ."73 Contrasting Walker v. City of Birmingham74
with the Court's refusal to consider constitutional constraints on police
violence in cases such as Rizzo v. Goode75 and City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons,76 Cover concludes that the judge is " 'strong' when the court is
aligned with state violence and 'weak' when the court is a counter
weight to that violence. The result in all cases is deference to the
authoritarian application of violence, whether it originates in court or
ders or in systems of administration. "77
If the McCleskey majority prefers order over fairness, it is not be
cause the opinion's "rhetorical strategies have the effect of allowing
the Court to conceal from itself the reality of the choice that it is
making" (p. 210), but because that is the choice that the Court usually
makes. The authors portray the Justices as creatures ensnared by their
own rhetoric. But it would be more true to a "cultural psychology"

69. BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING, supra note 11, at 29.
70. Robert M. Cover,

Violence and the Word,

95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).

71. See id. at 1606-07 ("[I]t is precisely this embedding of an understanding of political
text in institutional modes of action that distinguishes legal interpretation. . . . Legal interpre
tation is either played out on the field of pain and death or it is something less (or more)
than law."); id. at 1613 ("[L]egal interpretation is as a practice incomplete without vio
lence.").
tive,

72. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983).
73.

Id.

Court 1982 Term - Foreword:
.

Nomos

and Narra-

at 54.

74. 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (holding that an injunction must be obeyed - and violators remain subject to contempt - even when the order is later held unconstitutional).
75 . 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
76. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
77. Cover, supra note 72, at 5 6.
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that is concerned "with situated action"78 to see the Justices as acting
within and constrained by a network of roles, relationships, and cul
tural expectations. Perhaps Powell saw McCleskey differently after
four years because he had escaped the magic of his own rhetoric. Or
perhaps he saw it differently because, in retirement, he had left behind
some of the more straitjacketing constraints of his previous role.
III.

UNITIES OF PLOT, CHARACTER, AND ACTION

-

MICHAEL H.

In 1989, the Michigan Law Review published an influential sympo
sium on legal storytelling.79 My contribution explored the question
whether the new learning on categorization could profitably be ap
plied to a topic as nuanced and vast as narrative.80 Despite many di
vergences, we readily recognize Bible stories, Native American and
other folktales, modern novels, even avant-garde literature as exam
ples of the single category "narrative." What, I wondered, unites all
these very different cultural productions as instances of the same phe
nomenon?
Much of the literature at that time emphasized the social contin
gency of narrative, its highly contextual nature, and the degree to
which it depends upon subjective processes of interpretation. Con
sider, for example, Bruner's roughly contemporaneous 1991 effort "to
lay out the ground plan of narrative realities."81 He offered a highly
abstract "armature on which a more systematic account [of narrative]
might be constructed."82 This account identified ten features - narra
tive diachronicity, particularity, intentional state entailments, herme
neutic composability, canonicity and breach, genericness, normative
ness, context sensitivity and negotiability, and narrative accrual that, for present purposes, can be condensed to five.
First, narrative consists of "patterns of events occurring over
time."83 But, Bruner maintained, there are many "conventions for ex
pressing the sequenced durativity of narrative . . . . "84 Second, stories
have structural parts - in Vladimir Propp's terms, "functions" that
can only be understood relative to the story as a whole, while the story
as a whole "is dependent for its formation on the supply of possible
constituent parts. . . . The telling of a story and its comprehension as a
story depend on the human capacity to process knowledge in this in78. BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING, supra note 11, at 19.
79. Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
80. Winter, Narrative Meaning, supra note 4.
81. Bruner, supra note 21, at 21.
82.

Id.

83.

Id at 6.

84. Id.

at 5.
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terpretive way."8 5 Third, stories use the particular to state the general:
a "story's components, insofar as they become its 'function' or cap
tives, lose their status as singular and definite referring expressions;" a
particular "becomes, as it were, a type rather than a token."86 Fourth,
though genres channel interpretation for both author and reader, nar
rative is inherently interpretive. "Interpretation . . . is studded with
problems . . . that have to do more with context than text, with the
conditions on telling rather than with what is told."87 For a story to
work, the reader must both attribute intentionality to the teller and
use her background knowledge to "negotiate" the text. Thus, Bruner
explicitly rejected the suspension of disbelief as "at best an idealiza
tion of the reader and, at worst, a distortion of what the process of
narrative comprehension involves. Inevitably, we assimilate narrative
on our own terms . . . . "88
Fifth, narrative is "necessarily normative."89 Stories "must be about
how an implicit canonical script has been breache9, violated, or devi
ated from . . . . "90 Trouble "provides the engine of drama" and is "an
imbalance between any and all of five elements" of Actor, Goal,
Scene, and lnstrument.91 "The very notion of Trouble presupposes
that Actions should fit Goals appropriately, Scenes be suited to In
struments, and so on."92 But, "differences in how the notion of breach
is conceived" are culturally contingent and resolution of the Trouble is
not a necessary element of narrative.93
In contrast to this highly abstract, recondite "ground plan," I of
fered an account of narrative as concrete, highly structured, and sys
tematic. "[N]arrative proceeds from the ground up," deriving its
power from its very concreteness.94 I argued that the concept "narra
tive" could be captured by a single, elegant model structured in terms
of four embodied schemas and a handful of basic metaphors.9 5 I then
85. Id. at 8 (discussing VLADIMIR PROPP, MORPHOLOGY OF THE FOLKTALE (2d ed.
1968)); see also Jerome Bruner, The Future of Fact: What is Narrative Fact?, 560 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 17, 22-24 (1998) (discussing Propp's morphology of narrative).
86. Bruner, supra note 21, at 13.
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id. at l7.
89. Id. at 15.
90. Id. at 1 1 .
91. Id. a t 16.
92. BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING, supra note 11, at 50.
93. Bruner, supra note 21, at 15-16 ("Nor is it required of narrative, by the way, that the
Trouble with which it deals be resolved.")
94. Winter, Narrative Meaning, supra note 4, at 2228.
95. Id. at 2239-43. My account of story structure was also drawn from Propp and struc
turalist successors such as Roland Barthes but owed a great deal to conversations with
George Lakoff and Mark Turner.

1628

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1607

showed how that model accounts for a broad range of narrative run
ning all the way from folktales to the avant-garde.96
Essentially, that model maps a JOURNEY schema in which the pro
tagonist (the metaphorical or literal traveler) starts in an initial state
- a status quo - in which life is in harmonious balance. Something
disturbs that balance - a need, a lack, a deprivation, or a transforma
tion. The antagonist is, typically, the agent that causes the transforma
tion or lack. The protagonist sets out to restore the balance; in doing
so, he or she encounters obstacles that must be overcome. Typically,
the OBSTACLE entailment of the JOURNEY schema is filled out in the
story domain with an agon that serves as the pivotal point of the narra
tive. The agon is an encounter and conflict . with the antagonist. Its
resolution also restores the initial imbalance or achieves some new
balanced state. This provides narrative with a sense of closure. Be
cause a "story is conceptualized as movement along a path . . . we do
not think it much of a 'story' if the account 'goes nowhere,' if it has no
'point.' "97 Thus, the reader understands the narrator to be asking him
or her to follow the story to its end and to draw that point as the
moral: "We imagine ourselves as the protagonist and picture ourselves
in the protagonist's shoes as we proceed from introduction to conclu
sion."98
More elaborate stories are constructed as variants in which the
elements of the model are instantiated, reordered, or deliberately de
formed in different ways (and to different degrees). Understood as a
model that enables such modes of extension, this description of basic
story structure accounts for a broad range of narrative running from
the Midrash, Aesop's Fables, and Russian folktales, through Apache
and other Native American stories all the way to such avant-garde
narratives as Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot and Tom Stoppard's
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead.99
My purpose in describing an underlying model for the category
"narrative" was to argue against then-voguish views that identified
narrative as the basic unit that organizes meaning. Thus, my principal
point was that we recognize narratives as such because we have a
model of basic story structure. This is what enables us immediately to
identify the novel, the Midrash, and the Apache historical narrative as
examples of the same "thing," as instantiations of the same process.
So, too, the meaning of any particular story is only possible because it
is constructed of pre-given understandings of common events and con96.

Id.

at 2239-43, 2246-55.

97.

Id.

at 2236.

98.

Id.

at 2272.

99. Id. at 2239-55. This argument also appears in my forthcoming book, A CLEARING IN
THE FOREST, supra note 36, where I extend the point to include standard legal scholarship
such as RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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cepts, configured into the particular pattern of story-meaning. Like
any other form of communication, in other words, narrative is en
meshed in and dependent upon the structures of social meaning com
monly referred to as "scripts," "stock stories," or "idealized cognitive
models.''.
Amsterdam and Bruner now appear to have been persuaded (at
least in part) by my basic account of story structure. In their book,
they explain that:
Stories go somewhere. They have an end, a telos. If someone drifts in
telling a story, we urge him or her to "get to the point." What gives sto
ries this "point" is that, just as they have a telos, they also have to do with
some obstacle blocking progress toward it. If there is no obstacle, no
Trouble, there is no story - only a recital of some happening that un
folded banally with nothing untoward to tell about. [p. 127]

That basic story trajectory is now captured in what they offer as an
"austere definition" of narrative.
The unfolding of the plot requires (implicitly or explicitly):
(1) an initial steady state grounded in the legitimate ordinariness of
things,
(2) that gets disrupted by a Trouble consisting of the circumstances at
tributable to human agency or susceptible to change the human interven
tion,
(3) in turn evoking efforts at redress or transformation, which succeed or
fail,
(4) so that the old steady state is restored or a new (transformed) steady
state is created,
(5) and the story concludes by drawing the then-and-there of the tale that
has been told into the here-and-now of the telling through some coda say, for example, Aesop's characteristic moral of the story. [pp. 1 13-14]

Though many of Bruner's original ten features figure in the current
account (most notably breach of canonical scripts and the inherently
normative quality of narrative (pp. 121-24)), other positions have
changed dramatically.100 Where previously Bruner maintained that de
tails lose their status as singular and definite, t.he authors now seem to
maintain the opposite, "We convert our telling into some sort of
'higher common sense' by personalizing it, playing on the hearer's
identification, giving it a vivid time arrow, and the rest" (p. 135).
Where Bruner previously rejected the suspension of disbelief as a
100. Originally, Bruner wrote that: "Insofar as the law insists on such accrual of cases as
'precedents,' and insofar as 'cases' are narratives, the legal system imposes an orderly prec
ess of narrative accrual." Bruner, supra note 21, at 18. Not surprisingly, the point about
precedent has been abandoned. Pn:cedent is now viewed, a la Dworkin, as "like a continuing
story, with the links between its continuing episodes forged as much by metaphor and anal
ogy . . . . " P. 141 .
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"distortion of . . . the process of narrative comprehension," we. are
now told that "good narrative leads to the suspension of disbelief and thus serves the ends of rhetoric very well indeed" (p. 135). Most
importantly, the idea of Trouble seems to have undergone some un
specified modifications. First, though the former definition of Trouble
is repeated (pp. 129-30), Trouble is now also identified with the
OBSTACLE entailment of the JOURNEY schema: "Stories go
somewhere. . . . If there is no obstacle, no Trouble, there is no story"
(p. 127). Second, the claim that Trouble need not be resolved has been
left behind and the need for some resolution in the form of a restored
or transformed status quo has now been embraced.
But just as Amsterdam and Bruner embrace the new learning on
categorization without having fully assimilated its implications, they
deploy the model of basic story structure without a thorough under
standing of its relation to the fundamental shift in the theory of cate
gorization. Here, as there, something is lost in translation.
First, where I described basic story structure as a model that en
ables various modes of extension, Amsterdam and Bruner offer it as a
definition.101 This severely limits the cogency and usefulness of the ac
count. Viewed as a set of criteria, the austere definition plainly cannot
begin to account for the range of forms that human storytelling takes.
And, as we shall see, this remains true even after Amsterdam and
Bruner have grafted onto the austere definition their more elaborate
cultural account of narrative. Second, they replicate many of the mis
takes catalogued in the previous section. Third, because the authors
do not take "narrative" itself as a subject of human processes of cate
gorization, the principal conclusion that they draw is the very one un
dermined by this approach to story structure (and, more generally, by
the approach to categorization they outlined in Chapter Two). And
this in turn circumscribes in an important way their reading of Michael
H.

The authors posit two general theoretical approaches to narrative
that they characterize as the "endogenous" (pp. 115-16) and those that
involve "culture and human interaction much more directly" (pp. 11617). The central claim of endogenous theories is that "narrative is in
herent either in the nature of the human mind, in the nature of lan
guage, or in those supposed programs alleged to run our nervous sys
tems" (p. 115). The basic claim of the second group is that "narratives
and genres of narrative serve to model characteristic plights of culture
sharing human groups" (p. 117). The authors criticize endogenous

101. Cf. Winter, Narrative Meaning, supra note 4, at 2246 (explaining that the model of
basic story structure is not "a definition of the categorical, necessary, and sufficient condi
tions of all stories" but an idealized model "that describes the prototypical story. To put it
another way, the model describes the conditions sufficient for an account to be recognizable
as a story. It does not purport to define or delimit the necessary conditions for narratives.").
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theories because they leave unspecified the innate mechanism of nar
rative. "The real issue is what is innate about it, and how it works to
constrain the ways we speak" (p. 116). The authors suggest, however,
that both endogenous and plight-modeling approaches might be right
(p. 119).
The first thing to notice about this way of laying out the issues is
that it crudely polarizes the alternatives into the traditional dualism of
objective and subjective: either narrative is hard-wired or it is a contin
gent matter of one's cultural inheritance. The second thing to notice is
that, though the authors purport to avoid this crude dichotomiza
tion, 102 in fact they do not. The endogenous dimensions of narrative
are never mentioned again. What the reader gets instead is a more de
tailed version of the plight-modeling, cultural account. Thus, the
authors maintain that " 'forms of life' inherent in a culture's world
view" are "embodied and instantiated in its lore and myths. . . . Narra
tive, in a word, models a culture's conception of human character and
its plights" (pp. 131-32). In fact, the authors take the point one step
further and claim that "narrative genres are mental models repre
senting possible ways in which events in the human world can go."103
The third thing to notice is that there is already an account of the
sort they suggest connecting the embodied (i.e., the endogenous) and
the cultural: it is the one summarized earlier.104 Amsterdam and
Bruner do not discuss it. For one thing, this more complex account is
premised on evidence that bodily states - balance, movement
through space, blockage, exertion of force to overcome obstacles, etc.
- play a constitutive role in higher-order mental functions.10 5 Bruner,
no doubt, rejects such theories; for him, the "biological substrate" is at
most a precondition for or constraint on action - and one to be over
come by culture, at that.106 For another, this account is critical of the
notion put forward by the authors here that narratives serve, in their
words, as "mental models representing possible ways in which events
in the human world can go."
102. The authors use this "complementarity" tack again when they say that both the
social-institutional positivists and the interpretivists in anthropology are correct. Pp. 225-26.
103. P. 133; cf Cover, supra note 72, at 5 ("narratives . . . are the trajectories plotted
upon material reality by our imaginations").
104. The authors claim that "the extant general theories" do not explain why narrative
"depends so fundamentally upon the manipulation of time" pp. 1 19-20 - though this is a
point I thought I had addressed. See Winter, Narrative Meaning, supra note 4, at 2235-38.
105. I detail some of this in my forthcoming book, but a better place to begin is with
Gerald Edelman's two most recent books: GERALD M. EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, BRILLIANT
FIRE: ON THE MATIER OF THE MIND (1992); GERALD M. EDELMAN & GIULIO TONONI,
CONSCIOUSNESS: How MATIER BECOMES IMAGINATION (2000) .
106. BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING, supra note 11, at 20-21. Of course, simply ignoring
positions with which one disagrees is no substitute for an argument about why one thinks
they are wrong.
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The strength of Amsterdam and Bruner's treatment is that it pro
vides a cogent account of the very large class of narratives that weave
together a culture's conceptions of what is ordinary and legitimate, of
the proper ends of human striving, of the common shapes of misfor
tune, of the range of possible plights and of the appropriate responses
(p. 133). The weakness of their treatment, however, is that it is simul
taneously too broad and too narrow. The claim is too broad because
not all narratives serve as cultural models. It is hard to shoehorn
avant-garde narrative into this definition - though the authors try.107
(Surely, Waiting for Godot offers profound commentary on the human
condition. But does anyone seriously take it as a mental model for
ways in which human life should or shouldn't go?) The claim is too
narrow because not all our mental models of how human life should
go take the form of narrative. The authors (pp. 45, 121-22), for exam
ple, draw a distinction between narratives and scripts such as Schank
and Ableson's famous example of the restaurant scenario.108 Scripts
denote "the normal ways in which people go about and are expected
to go about in their ordinary daily lives: how to get a meal in a restau
rant, how to plead before a court of law" (p. 121). Narratives "illus
trate what happens when a script is thrown off track" (p. 45). But this
means, as they seem to · recognize, that "much of our background
knowledge of the culture is organized in . . . scripts" (p. 121). Indeed,
without such scripts there would be no narrative at all.
Thus, precisely as I argued in 1989,109 the problem with accounts
that - like Amsterdam and Bruner's - want to ground everything in
narrative is that they presuppose the very intersubjectivity they are
trying to explain: How do different members of the culture arrive at
the same understanding of the meta-narrative? This problem of vi
cious circularity is clear in Amsterdam and Bruner's account. On one
hand, they claim that "[c]ategories are derived or extracted from
larger-scale theories, stories, or normative redes about 'reality' (p.
37)." On the other hand, they acknowledge that those same large
scale, normative narratives can only be understood by reference to the
scripts and categories that organize o.ur background knowledge of the
culture. And, after that, it's just turtles all the way down.11°

107. They suggest (rather lamely, I think) that: "Perhaps Ionesco and Genet launched
new possibilities with their creation of the theater of the absurd." P. 133.
108. ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS AND
UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES 42-46 (1977),
discussed in L6pez, supra note 1, at 5-7 & nn.5, 8; Winter, Narrative Meaning, supra note 4,
at 2233-34.
109.

Winter, Narrative Meaning, supra note 4, at 2257-62.

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 28-29 (1973);
WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY
104 (1897) (rocks).
1 10. See
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Of course, not all mental models consist of scripts. Some are
image-schematic, some metaphorical, some metonymic. Consider the
character that we encountered at the close of the previous section: the
statesmanlike judge, the pillar of the community whose duty first and
foremost is to the established order. We have neither a script nor a
narrative for that; what we have is a mental picture, an image, a role
model or iconic representative such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.11 1
This is the power of Lakoff's concept of an idealized cognitive model:
it provides a more general approach to this idea of category structure.
Which brings us to Michael H. Following Propp, the authors pro
vide a structural reading of Scalia's plurality opinion as instantiating
the adultery-story subspecies of Western combat myths (pp. 79-102).112
This reading is followed by a close analysis of the rhetorics of the
opinion (pp. 102-09). Both are quite detailed, I have only a quibble or
two with these discussions, and I will not try to summarize them. As
noted earlier, I think that this is one of the stronger sections of the
book.
What interests me, however, is the way in which the focus on nar
rative and rhetoric obscures a potentially more revealing insight - a
deeper unity, as it were - into the worldview that constructs Scalia's
text. Consonant with their ingrained view of radical subjectivity, the
authors consistently present Scalia in the active .voice: "Justice Scalia
simultaneously creates the category of 'the unitary family' and sancti
fies it" (p. 105).113 But it is not a category of family that Scalia is in
venting (and, in any event, he would hardly be the first to sanctify it).
What Scalia is creating is an unusual label or description - "the uni
tary family" - for an existing category that already has a conventional
name - the nuclear family. 11 4 Why, then, the unusual "unitary" label?
111. This, by the way, was Holmes's encomium to Lemuel Shaw: "[T]he strength of that
great judge Jay in an accurate appreciation of the requirements of the community whose of
ficer he was." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 85 (Mark Howe ed.,
1963) (originally published 1881).
112. In one of the better passages, the authors note trenchantly that what "Justice Scalia
cannot countenance in Michael H. is not that Victoria should have two acknowledged fa
thers, but rather that Victoria's mother should have two acknowledged lovers: It is this licen
tious model which cannot be squared with Justice Scalia's cuckold-phobic vision of the 'uni
tary family.' " P. 82. Note the quotes around "unitary family," which is Scalia's phrase.
113. Other examples include:
- "[T)he Demon Lover adultery tale" is "the tale Justice Scalia chooses to tell." P. 99.
- "But Justice Scalia is driving those methodologies while appearing merely to ride them."
P. 106 (emphasis in original).
- "His entire opinion is a demonstration of the limitless license that judges acquire to reify
and deify their predilections . . . . " P. 108.
114. Justice Scalia's precise statement is that the right to privacy precedents "rest not
upon such isolated factors but upon the historic respect - indeed, sanctity would not be too
strong a term - traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary
family." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989).

1634

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1607

And why invent a new term when, considering his emphasis on tradi
tion, the familiar one would serve Scalia's purposes as well or even
better?
Linguistic markings of this sort are significant because they typi
cally indicate some variance from the default assumptions that consti
tute the standard case. It is of particular interest here because it is so
similar to another Scalia coinage - "the unitary executive." That
phrase first appears in the United States Reports in Justice Scalia's
dissent in Morrison v. Olsen.115 It has gained little currency with other
members of the Court,116 though it has been taken up by some com
mentators. According to two such proponents, unitary executive theo
rists read Article II
as creating a hierarchical, unified executive department under the direct
control of the President. They conclude that the President alone pos
sesses all of the executive power and that he therefore can direct, control,
and supervise inferior officers or agencies who seek to exercise discre
tionary executive power.117

In strikingly similar terms, Justice Scalia describes the parental rights
of the father as including
the right to the child's services and earnings; the right to direct the child's
activities; the right to make decisions regarding the control, education,
and health of the child; and the right, as well as the duty, to prepare the
child for additional obligations, which includes the teaching of moral
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.118

This is what Lakoff has characterized as the "strict father" model un
derlying political conservatism and conservative morality - a world
view that emphasizes authority, strength, order.119 Every family must
115. 487 U.S. 654, 727, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The position derives from
Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (stating that
the President may supervise and guide statutory construction by executive officers "in order
to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the Constitution
evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone"); see also
United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 449 (1988) (Scalia, J.) ("This enables the develop
ment . . . of a unitary and consistent Executive Branch position on matters involving person
nel action . . . .").
116. The other appearances of the phrase are in Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
and in a parenthetical in Justice
417, 490 (1998) - an opinion that,
incidentally, was joined by Justice Scalia.

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 n.12 (1997),
Breyer's dissent in Clinton v. City ofNew York, 524 U.S.

117. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
ecutive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1 155, 1 165-66 (1992).

Ex

118. 491 U.S. at 1 18-19 (quoting 4 CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW § 60.02[1][b] (C. Markey
ed. 1987)).
119. GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: WHAT CONSERVATIVES KNOW THAT
LIBERALS DON'T 65-67 (1996); see also GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY
IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 312-14
(1999). On Justice Scalia's incipient authoritarianism, see Steven L. Winter, What If Justice
Scalia Took History and the Rule of Law Seriously?, 12 DUKE ENV'L LAW & POLICY
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have one father, firmly in control; the country, one president of indis
putable and indivisible authority. This worldview, moreover, is of a
piece with Justice Scalia's well-known preference for hard-and-fast
rules.12° Certainly, all this would have come as no surprise to the
author of the very first book on law and mind. One can just hear him
chuckling in the background, pointing out that
it is obvious enough: To the child the father is the Infallible Judge, the
Maker of definite rules of conduct. He knows precisely what is right and
what is wrong and, as head of the family, sits in j udgment and punishes
misdeeds. The Law - a body of rules apparently devised for infallibly
determining what is right and what is wrong and for deciding who should
be punished for misdeeds - inevitably becomes a partial substitute for
the Father-as-Infallible-Judge. That is, the desire persists in grown man·
to recapture, through a rediscovery of a father, a childish, completely
controllable universe, and that desire seeks satisfaction in a partial, un
conscious, anthropomorphizing of Law, in ascribing to the Law some of
the characteristics of the child's Father-Judge. That childish longing is an
important element in the explanation of the absurdly unrealistic notion
that Law is, or can be made, entirely certain and definitely predictable.121

Indeed, Jerome Frank probably would have said that Justice Scalia
longs to be that father. Or, he might have pointed him to the couch.
IV.

MISUNDERSTANDING LAW AND CULTURE

There is a virtual revolution going on in the cognitive sciences. De
velopments over the last three decades have transformed our under
standing of categorization, of logic, of imagination, and of the relation
ship between body and mind. As these developments slowly work
their way into legal theory, they will transform the way we see a lot of
things. The crude legal realism that focuses on judicial manipulation
and its conventional opposite, the search for external constraints, will
give way. What will replace them will, I think, be something much
closer to the most sophisticated legal realist insights of Karl Llewellyn.
For it was Llewellyn who first taught us sixty-five years ago that to
categorize is to decide: "[I]f there is the slightest doubt about the clas
sification of the facts - though they be undisputed - the rule cannot
decide the case; it is decided by the classifying."122
Categorization and adjudication are both social processes. Judges
must communicate; more than that, they must persuade. They must
_
FORUM 155 (2001) (Symposium on "Citizen Suits and the Future of Standing in the 21st
Century: From Lujan to Laidlaw and Beyond").

120. Antonin Scalia,
(1989).

The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,

56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175

121. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 18 (1930).
122. Karl N. Llewellyn,
(1934).

. 34 COLUM. L. REV. .1, 8

The Constitution as an Institution,
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persuade us that what they decide is worthy of our obedience, worthy
of designation as Law. To do that, their categories must connect with
ours in a profound way. That is why judges, even Supreme Court Jus
tices, write like advocates. And that is one of the reasons that culture
necessarily works its way into law.
The other reason is both more basic and unavoidable. The fact that
categorization is functional and pragmatic means that it is socially con
tingent in the sense that a society's categories encode its customary
operations, its standard repertoire of purposes, its conventional roles,
its approved modes of behavior. Categorization, in other words, al
ready does all of the things that Amsterdam and Bruner attribute to
narrative. This was already implicit in L6pez's groundbreaking article,
and is perhaps its most significant contribution. But once we under
stand that function and purpose are built-in, constitutive dimensions
of our categories, we cannot escape the conclusion that categorization
(like narrative) is profoundly normative. With that realization must
come the recognition that adjudication is not only intensely political,
but also in some sense inherently conservative. For the judge cannot
approach the case - any case - without bringing with her the entire
repertoire of cultural categories with their normatively loaded under
standings. And if the judge is to be persuasive, her categories will have
to reflect the most mainstream values and understandings. Which
means that adjudication (if not, indeed, law more generally) is typi
cally conservative in the sense that it enforces - and reinforces - the
dominant normative views of the culture.
But all that is for another book.

